The debate over state policing has largely focused on whether Nigeria should decentralise law enforcement.
Senior Advocate of Nigeria Dr. Olisa Agbakoba argues that this is the wrong question. The more fundamental issue, he says, is whether Nigeria is prepared to constitutionally protect public institutions from political capture.
In a letter to the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, George Akume, Agbakoba welcomed President Bola Tinubu’s decision to transmit a constitutional amendment bill on state police to the National Assembly. But he warned that creating state police without strong constitutional safeguards would simply shift the danger of abuse from Abuja to the states.
“I commend the President for transmitting to the National Assembly an executive Bill proposing the amendment of Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution to introduce the long-awaited state police,”
Agbakoba wrote. “This is a welcome development that will, if properly implemented, enhance public security and bring law enforcement closer to the communities it serves.”
His central argument is that Nigeria’s constitutional architecture not merely the structure of policing is the real problem. Institutions created to serve the public have repeatedly become extensions of executive power because they lack meaningful constitutional independence.
“Devolution without institutional protection is reform in name only, and history has shown that where institutions lack genuine constitutional protection, they inevitably become instruments of executive power rather than servants of the people and the Constitution,” he said.
Looking to South Africa
Agbakoba points to South Africa’s Constitution as a model Nigeria should emulate. Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution establishes a category of institutions specifically protected from executive interference, with constitutional guarantees of independence, secure tenure for their leadership and funding insulated from political control.
He argues that Nigeria should adopt a similar framework by moving critical institutions outside direct executive influence.
Among the institutions he says should receive constitutional protection are the Nigeria Police Force, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the National Judicial Council, the National Human Rights Commission, the Attorney General, the Accountant General and the Code of Conduct Bureau.
Rather than reporting to the President or governors, these institutions, he argues, should have constitutionally guaranteed tenure, funding charged directly to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and accountability primarily to the legislature.
Beyond State Police
Agbakoba also uses the moment to reopen Nigeria’s wider federalism debate.
If policing can be devolved, he asks, why should the Federal Government continue to control functions such as drivers’ licensing, prisons, marriage registration, arbitration, trade regulation and business name registration that could be administered more efficiently by states or local governments?
The proposal reflects a broader philosophy of reducing the concentration of power at the centre while strengthening institutions rather than individual officeholders.
Limited Government, Strong Institutions
Invoking the constitutional scholarship of the late Professor Ben Nwabueze, Agbakoba argues that Nigeria should embrace the principle of “limited government,” under which executive authority is deliberately constrained by autonomous constitutional institutions.
“This process has been described by Professor Ben Nwabueze as the concept of limited government, which is the principle that executive power is not at large but is constrained by independent institutions guaranteed by the Constitution,” he wrote.
He cautioned that state police could become even more susceptible to political abuse than the current federal system if governors are given unchecked authority.
“If not, if state police are simply handed to governors without these protections, they will inevitably become tools of oppression, and Nigeria will have traded one problem for a far worse one.”
Shared Appointment Model
To prevent political capture, Agbakoba proposes an appointment process modelled on judicial independence.
Under his proposal, the Police Service Commission would recommend qualified candidates, governors would formally appoint them and State Houses of Assembly would confirm the appointments. The same three-way process would apply to removals, ensuring that no single branch of government could install or dismiss a police chief unilaterally.
The proposal shifts the constitutional conversation beyond whether Nigeria should establish state police to the more consequential question of whether the country’s democratic institutions can ever function independently while remaining subject to executive control.
If the Tinubu administration is prepared to address that question, Agbakoba argues, the state police amendment could become the starting point for a far more significant restructuring of Nigeria’s constitutional order than policing alone.
