In a crowded hall in Kano, a preacher from Kaduna addresses a captivated audience. His message is clear: rival Islamic sects are infiltrating key sectors like hospitals and banks. He urges his followers to counter this threat by entering these professions themselves. Elsewhere, a Kano-based preacher delivers a scathing critique of Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad, not because of his brutal repression, but because he deems Assad to be a non-Muslim. The subtext is unmissable: the religious identity of a leader is more important than his ethical conduct.
This narrative, shared by Dr. Raji Bello, Chief Consultant Anaesthesiologist and Head of Department at Modibbo Adama University Teaching Hospital, Yola, Nigeria, highlights a growing ideological shift in northern Nigeria’s Islamic preaching landscape. Dr. Bello’s observations are not fringe, nor are they isolated. They’re part of a mainstream rhetoric in northern Nigeria, a region whose public education system has been in long-term decline. As a result, children often attend Islamic schools run by these same preachers, many of whom have been trained in Middle Eastern and North African religious institutions. When they return home, they bring with them not only theological credentials but also the ideological currents of their host countries — often far more conservative, confrontational, and hostile to pluralism than what Nigeria’s indigenous Islamic traditions embraced.
This landscape has deep historical roots. After his pilgrimage to Makkah, the late Nigerian politician Sir Ahmadu Bello founded Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), or the “Society for the Support of Islam,” with ambitious goals to promote Islam in Nigeria. JNI’s mission included spreading Islamic teachings, defending the rights of Muslims, and fostering ties between Nigerian Muslims and the global Islamic community. Bello’s initiative reflected a broader strategy of institutionalizing Islamic preaching as a tool for societal transformation, embedding the religion deeply into the political and social fabric of northern Nigeria. Over the decades, however, this institutionalized preaching has morphed into a platform for more confrontational and radical ideologies, particularly as external influences began to shape the narrative.
These imported ideologies are thriving, not because they are inherently more appealing, but because the Nigerian state’s regulatory and security capacity is too weak to contain them. Unlike the countries from which these ideas originate — where governments issue state-approved sermons and outlaw unsanctioned gatherings — Nigeria’s laissez-faire approach has created fertile ground for extremist ideologies to flourish. The story of this unfolding crisis can be understood through three interconnected frameworks: the concept of ideological Salafism and transnational influence, religious market theory, and failed state theory. Together, they illustrate how foreign ideologies are imported, amplified by local competition, and left unchecked by a state that has all but abandoned its regulatory role.
The concept of ideological Salafism and transnational influence highlights how ideological currents from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are exported to countries like Nigeria. Many Nigerian preachers pursue advanced religious studies in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan, returning home as ideological emissaries. They import not only the theology of their host countries but also their social and political attitudes, especially the antagonism toward “rival” Islamic sects and non-Muslims. Unlike in their countries of training, where the state tightly controls religious discourse, these preachers operate without oversight in Nigeria. While sermons in Saudi Arabia are pre-approved by the state and religious gatherings are monitored, Nigeria’s weak regulatory capacity allows these preachers to broadcast their ideological “fragments” without restriction. This lack of oversight provides fertile ground for the radicalization of communities.
These ideological imports have transformed Nigeria’s religious landscape. Many of the preachers, shaped by the conservatism of their foreign instructors, establish private religious schools where they educate a new generation of children with imported worldviews. These schools operate in an ideological vacuum, often free from state scrutiny. Children raised in these environments are exposed to teachings that frame rival Islamic sects, non-Muslims, and even the Nigerian government as threats. Without an interventionist state to balance these narratives, Nigeria’s ideological environment has become a breeding ground for polarization and radicalism.
Compounding this issue is religious market theory, which explains the rise of radical preachers in northern Nigeria as a consequence of unregulated religious competition. Unlike in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, where religious discourse is monopolized and controlled by the state, Nigeria’s religious environment resembles a free market. Preachers compete for followers, and to distinguish themselves from rivals, they adopt more radical and sensationalist rhetoric. The preacher’s call for his followers to join public institutions like banks and hospitals can be seen as a strategic move in this competitive environment. By portraying rival Islamic sects as infiltrators and invoking a “battle ahead,” he positions his group as defenders of the faith, thereby galvanizing followers. This logic of competition drives preachers to use language that stokes fear and grievance, as they seek to establish loyalty and dominance in the religious marketplace.
The Nigerian state’s failure to regulate this religious market is itself a reflection of failed state theory. When states fail to provide public goods like education, security, and the regulation of religious institutions, non-state actors step in to fill the void. In northern Nigeria, preachers have taken on the role of educators, establishing Islamic schools in the absence of adequate public education. These schools become ideological factories where children are indoctrinated into rigid worldviews. The government’s absence is felt not only in the classroom but also in the public space, where religious discourse goes unregulated. In countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, religious expression is subject to intense scrutiny. But in Nigeria, where state capacity is limited, preachers operate freely, and the state’s regulatory vacuum allows extremist ideologies to thrive.
Nigeria’s situation is not hopeless. Other countries have tackled similar issues using innovative approaches. Kenya’s “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE) strategy focuses on community-based interventions, like creating alternative messaging to radical narratives and retraining preachers. Indonesia’s pesantren system (Islamic boarding schools) operates with state oversight and offers a more moderate form of Islamic education. Nigeria can learn from these models by developing a comprehensive strategy to regulate preaching, strengthen oversight of religious schools, and reclaim its role as a provider of public education.
The path forward requires decisive action. Nigeria’s government should introduce a licensing system for preachers, requiring them to obtain certification from a national regulatory body. This process would evaluate the preacher’s education, ideological stance, and public rhetoric. Religious schools run by preachers should be subject to government oversight, with a curriculum that balances religious and secular education. Diplomatic engagements with countries like Saudi Arabia should address the ideological content “exported” to Nigeria, and returning students from foreign religious institutions should be monitored and registered in a database to track their activities.
The growth of radical Islamic preaching in northern Nigeria is not a spontaneous development. It is the result of a confluence of ideological imports, unregulated religious competition, and state failure. While the Middle Eastern countries that export these ideologies keep tight control at home, Nigeria’s weak regulatory capacity has allowed them to flourish. With stronger state oversight, a licensing system for preachers, and a revival of Nigeria’s public education system, the ideological landscape can be reshaped. Nigeria must become more than just a “consumer” of imported ideologies. It must become a regulator, ensuring that the ideas circulating within its borders are those that promote unity, peace, and coexistence.
Abimbola is the Managing Director of WNT Capitas, specializing in consulting on strategic communications, investment risk analysis, and policy reform. He holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge, where his dissertation focused on development aid conditionality.
An Exorbitant Import: How Can Nigeria Regulate Islamic Preaching?
The Evolution of Islamic Preaching in Nigeria- From Regulated Political Tool to Dangerous Political Competition
In a crowded hall in Kano, a preacher from Kaduna addresses a captivated audience. His message is clear: rival Islamic sects are infiltrating key sectors like hospitals and banks. He urges his followers to counter this threat by entering these professions themselves. Elsewhere, a Kano-based preacher delivers a scathing critique of Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad, not because of his brutal repression, but because he deems Assad to be a non-Muslim. The subtext is unmissable: the religious identity of a leader is more important than his ethical conduct.
This narrative, shared by Dr. Raji Bello, Chief Consultant Anaesthesiologist and Head of Department at Modibbo Adama University Teaching Hospital, Yola, Nigeria, highlights a growing ideological shift in northern Nigeria’s Islamic preaching landscape. Dr. Bello’s observations are not fringe, nor are they isolated. They’re part of a mainstream rhetoric in northern Nigeria, a region whose public education system has been in long-term decline. As a result, children often attend Islamic schools run by these same preachers, many of whom have been trained in Middle Eastern and North African religious institutions. When they return home, they bring with them not only theological credentials but also the ideological currents of their host countries — often far more conservative, confrontational, and hostile to pluralism than what Nigeria’s indigenous Islamic traditions embraced.
This landscape has deep historical roots. After his pilgrimage to Makkah, the late Nigerian politician Sir Ahmadu Bello founded Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), or the “Society for the Support of Islam,” with ambitious goals to promote Islam in Nigeria. JNI’s mission included spreading Islamic teachings, defending the rights of Muslims, and fostering ties between Nigerian Muslims and the global Islamic community. Bello’s initiative reflected a broader strategy of institutionalizing Islamic preaching as a tool for societal transformation, embedding the religion deeply into the political and social fabric of northern Nigeria. Over the decades, however, this institutionalized preaching has morphed into a platform for more confrontational and radical ideologies, particularly as external influences began to shape the narrative.
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These imported ideologies are thriving, not because they are inherently more appealing, but because the Nigerian state’s regulatory and security capacity is too weak to contain them. Unlike the countries from which these ideas originate — where governments issue state-approved sermons and outlaw unsanctioned gatherings — Nigeria’s laissez-faire approach has created fertile ground for extremist ideologies to flourish. The story of this unfolding crisis can be understood through three interconnected frameworks: the concept of ideological Salafism and transnational influence, religious market theory, and failed state theory. Together, they illustrate how foreign ideologies are imported, amplified by local competition, and left unchecked by a state that has all but abandoned its regulatory role.
The concept of ideological Salafism and transnational influence highlights how ideological currents from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are exported to countries like Nigeria. Many Nigerian preachers pursue advanced religious studies in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan, returning home as ideological emissaries. They import not only the theology of their host countries but also their social and political attitudes, especially the antagonism toward “rival” Islamic sects and non-Muslims. Unlike in their countries of training, where the state tightly controls religious discourse, these preachers operate without oversight in Nigeria. While sermons in Saudi Arabia are pre-approved by the state and religious gatherings are monitored, Nigeria’s weak regulatory capacity allows these preachers to broadcast their ideological “fragments” without restriction. This lack of oversight provides fertile ground for the radicalization of communities.
These ideological imports have transformed Nigeria’s religious landscape. Many of the preachers, shaped by the conservatism of their foreign instructors, establish private religious schools where they educate a new generation of children with imported worldviews. These schools operate in an ideological vacuum, often free from state scrutiny. Children raised in these environments are exposed to teachings that frame rival Islamic sects, non-Muslims, and even the Nigerian government as threats. Without an interventionist state to balance these narratives, Nigeria’s ideological environment has become a breeding ground for polarization and radicalism.
Compounding this issue is religious market theory, which explains the rise of radical preachers in northern Nigeria as a consequence of unregulated religious competition. Unlike in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, where religious discourse is monopolized and controlled by the state, Nigeria’s religious environment resembles a free market. Preachers compete for followers, and to distinguish themselves from rivals, they adopt more radical and sensationalist rhetoric. The preacher’s call for his followers to join public institutions like banks and hospitals can be seen as a strategic move in this competitive environment. By portraying rival Islamic sects as infiltrators and invoking a “battle ahead,” he positions his group as defenders of the faith, thereby galvanizing followers. This logic of competition drives preachers to use language that stokes fear and grievance, as they seek to establish loyalty and dominance in the religious marketplace.
The Nigerian state’s failure to regulate this religious market is itself a reflection of failed state theory. When states fail to provide public goods like education, security, and the regulation of religious institutions, non-state actors step in to fill the void. In northern Nigeria, preachers have taken on the role of educators, establishing Islamic schools in the absence of adequate public education. These schools become ideological factories where children are indoctrinated into rigid worldviews. The government’s absence is felt not only in the classroom but also in the public space, where religious discourse goes unregulated. In countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, religious expression is subject to intense scrutiny. But in Nigeria, where state capacity is limited, preachers operate freely, and the state’s regulatory vacuum allows extremist ideologies to thrive.
Nigeria’s situation is not hopeless. Other countries have tackled similar issues using innovative approaches. Kenya’s “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE) strategy focuses on community-based interventions, like creating alternative messaging to radical narratives and retraining preachers. Indonesia’s pesantren system (Islamic boarding schools) operates with state oversight and offers a more moderate form of Islamic education. Nigeria can learn from these models by developing a comprehensive strategy to regulate preaching, strengthen oversight of religious schools, and reclaim its role as a provider of public education.
The path forward requires decisive action. Nigeria’s government should introduce a licensing system for preachers, requiring them to obtain certification from a national regulatory body. This process would evaluate the preacher’s education, ideological stance, and public rhetoric. Religious schools run by preachers should be subject to government oversight, with a curriculum that balances religious and secular education. Diplomatic engagements with countries like Saudi Arabia should address the ideological content “exported” to Nigeria, and returning students from foreign religious institutions should be monitored and registered in a database to track their activities.
The growth of radical Islamic preaching in northern Nigeria is not a spontaneous development. It is the result of a confluence of ideological imports, unregulated religious competition, and state failure. While the Middle Eastern countries that export these ideologies keep tight control at home, Nigeria’s weak regulatory capacity has allowed them to flourish. With stronger state oversight, a licensing system for preachers, and a revival of Nigeria’s public education system, the ideological landscape can be reshaped. Nigeria must become more than just a “consumer” of imported ideologies. It must become a regulator, ensuring that the ideas circulating within its borders are those that promote unity, peace, and coexistence.
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Abimbola Agboluaje
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